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Since the mid-1950s, when Nikita Khrushchev initiated a policy of expanded 
involvement in the Third World, the region of Southwest Asia comprised of 
Afghanistan and Iran, has been high on the list of Soviet regional priorities 
The strategic location of the area— adjacent to the southern boundaries of the 
USSR as well as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region— and the Soviet 
concern about the concentration of U S political and military influence m  the 
entire area have been among the most important long-term determinants of Soviet 
policy During the past two decades concerns about the possible extension of 
Chinese influence into the region, as well as the critical importance of Persian 
Gulf petroleum resources for the OECD nations have added to the attractiveness 
of this part of the world for Soviet meddling, or at least influence-peddling 1 
The corollary of the Soviet attempt to preclude the establishment of 
influence in the region by one of the two major opponents of the USSR has been 
the desire to create a Soviet-oriented grouping of states The unsuccessful 
attempts m  the late 1960s and early 1970s to generate support for an Asian 
collective security system centered on Moscow provided evidence of this 
objective In addition to the broad goal of a Soviet-oriented bloc of states 
along the southern borders of the USSR, Soviet leaders have also been interested 
in military-security and economic benefits that they might gain from closer 
contact with the countries of the region Until the invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan in late 1979, however, the Soviets had made little headway m  
turning their economic, military and political involvement into an active 
military presence similar to what they were able to acquire in places such as 
Egypt (until 1972), Somalia (until 1977) and elsewhere m  Africa and Asia
Overall, Soviet policy m  Southwest Asia and the Gulf region has been an 
integral part of Soviet activities m  the Third World more generally and has, 
over time, been closely related to Soviet initiatives m  the Middle East and
2other portions of Asia The primary motivating factor m  Soviet policy has been 
the global competition with the United States and its allies and the desire to 
strengthen the overall security capabilities of the Soviet state, while at the 
same time undermining the long-term interests of the Western states
A Soviets Aim m  Afghanistan
The primary objectives of Soviet support for the conmunist Saur Revolution 
of April 1978 and of the invasion of late December 1979, which occurred after 
the Taraki and M m  regimes had proven incapable of generating even the most 
modest popular support for their brand of conmunist revolution, concerned the 
maintenance and strengthening of Soviet influence— even control— in a country 
considered of vital importance for long-term Soviet interests 2 Although such 
factors as the strategic benefits to be obtained by the presence of Soviet 
troops in Afghanistan could not have been ignored by those in the Kremlin who 
made the crucial decisions that culminated m  the occupation of Afghanistan by a 
Soviet military force that now totals over one hundred thousand troops, the 
major factors that resulted m  this decision were related to the fear that an 
anti-Soviet regime might come to power m  Afghanistan and eventually provide the 
United States with opportunities for influence in the region
It is true— and obviously of major significance for the interests of the 
United States and its allies— that one of the consequences of the Soviet 
invasion the extension of Soviet military power closer to the oilfields of the 
Gulf The continuing Soviet effort to consolidate its military and political 
domination in Afghanistan has also been coupled with diolomatic efforts aimed at 
"normalizing relations with a number of the important Gulf States, most 
importantly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
3Current Soviet policy in Afghanistan is oriented— as was Soviet policy in 
Eastern Europe m  the post-1945 period— toward the creation of a stable 
communist regime dependent upon and dominated by the USSR Such a regime would 
provide Moscow with a number of visible benefits First of all, the possibility 
of the rise of a hostile Afghan government allied with China or the West on the 
southern borders of the Soviet Union would be eliminated Closely related to 
this is the fact that a stable, communist Afghanistan would provide the USSR 
with an effective buffer m  the south and, moreover, would provide opportunities 
for influencing governments m  the region— m  particular those of Pakistan,
Iran, and other Gulf states Other factors that favor the continued Soviet 
efforts to "pacify" Afghanistan as a dependent communist state include the 
successful experience of the pacification of Central Asia by the Soviet 
government m  the 1920s, commitments to the Afgahn communist party— the People's 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)— and the unwillingness of the Soviet 
leadership to back down on such commitments, and the evidence that the 
successful creation of a communist regime m  Afghanistan would provide for the 
continuing vitality of the claimed inevitability of Marxism-Leninism as the 
single global social system of the future
Although the Soviets have been sporadically involved in U N -sponsored 
negotiations concerning the future of Afghanistan, it is clear that no 
successful agreement can be expected to enmate from these talks that would 
result m  a Soviet military withdrawal and the establishment of a truly 
autonomous Afghan government The major escalation of Soviet military 
operations in Afghanistan during the course of the past year and a half provide 
clear evidence that the Soviets are in Afghanistan to stay and that they are 
willing to expend the resources necessary to remain
4The costs that the Soviets have incurred m  Afghanistan during the course 
of more than five years of military occupation have been quite high, but 
definitely not of an order that would result m  a reconsideration of basic 
Soviet policy From Moscow's perspective the inevitability of the collapse of 
the PDPA regime in Kabul, were Soviet troops to be withdrawn, would bring with 
it costs far higner than those of continuing the military occupation and 
•pacification" of the country Although Soviet casualties have risen during the 
past two years as the level of fighting has escalated, they continue to remain 
relatively low Given the nature of the domestic political system in the USSR, 
costs (including military casualties) will not result m  widespread political 
pressures that favor withdrawal
The financial costs of the occupation are much more difficult to measure 
than even the military losses Yet even here the cost involved m  housing 
Soviet troops in Afghanistan and of conducting military operations are covered, 
m  part, by planned expenditures for housing and training manuevers that would 
have been necessary even without the invasion and occupation Although the 
initial political costs of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan were 
high— almost universal condemnation of the Soviet action, even among friendly 
states— they have had little concrete impact on longer-term Soviet relations 
with the outside world With a few exceptions— e g, the U S and Japanese 
partial economic embargoes— the external response to the USSR was largely verbal 
and was not translated into concrete actions
In sum, there is little evidence that the Soviets will consider leaving 
Afghanistan m  the foreseeable future, nor that the mujahideen who are carrying 
out the resistance to Soviet domination will be able to defeat them From the 
perspective of the Kremlin the stakes m  Afghanistan are high— the establishment
5of a stable and dependent ally along the southern Soviet frontier, the extension 
of Soviet military power into a region of strategic importance for both the 
Soviet Union and the West, and the expanded possibilities for extending Soviet 
influence into the Persian Gulf region— while the costs are tolerable Although 
the prospects for a rapid pacification of Afghanistan are bleak— even more than 
five years after the initial Soviet invasion— the Soviets will continue 
indefinitely to accept the costs involved m  the occupation of that country in 
the expectation of gradually wearing down and defeating the opponents of the 
Soviet-installed Babrak regime
B The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf
Although the Soviets have extended their military capabilities in Southwest 
Asia as a result of the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan— a factor which 
enhances the potential for expanding role m  the Persian Gulf region— they have 
yet to be able to employ those capabilities effectively as an instrument of 
influence m  the key Gulf states 3 Before turning to a fuller discussion of 
Soviet efforts to establish a presence and extend influence m  the region it is 
important to examine, albeit briefly, the importance of the Gulf for the 
interests of the United States and its Japanese and European allies
Unlike U S interest in Western Europe, which stems from longstanding links 
of culture and history and more recent concerns about markets, U S interests m  
the Gulf result from more recent and limited objectives Here the U S  is 
primarily interested m  ensuring continued access to the petroluem resources of 
the region and in the markets for industrial and agricultural exports which have 
been created through oil revenues 4
The major interest that Vfestern Europe, Japan and the other non-conmunist
6states of East Asia share with the United States m  the Persian Gulf are 
twofold first, an uninterrupted access to the petroluen reserves of the region 
and, second, access to the markets Given these interests, the key question 
that arises is how they may be undermined if the Soviet Union were to make 
encroachments m  the direction of the Gulf Broadly speaking, there are two 
dominant schools of though about Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf One view 
holds that the Soviet Union is interested in expanding towards the Gulf as part 
of the historic Russian drive to acquire warm-water ports This view is perhaps 
best expressed by W Scott Thompson, who argues
My working assumption is that it is basic Soviet strategy to 
reach the warm wates of the Indian Ocean There need be no 
"master plan" for this assumption to be seen as reasonable 
Moscow would understandably like to break out of what, at one 
period, it surely saw as its encirclement Its cultivation of 
good relations with India, its occupations of parts of Iran 
thrice m  this century, its invasion of Afghanistan, its treaty 
of friendship with Iraq, and its attempts to be the balancer m  
the Iran-Iraq war are all, m  part, manifestations of this 
general expansionist desire 5
It is important to note that analysts such as Thompson, who see the Soviets 
seeking to expand their horizons in the direction of the Gulf, also see a 
generally expansionist drive underlying all of Soviet foreign policy In 
contrast to the view taken by Thompson we find a markedly divergent view of 
Soviet interests and objectives expressed by other scholars working on Soviet 
policy m  the region For example, as R D McLaunn has written
The Persian Gulf has not, however, been a Soviet neighbor, either 
recently or m  the distant past The Gulf was of virtually no 
importance to Russia for centuries Where would Russian 
warm-water ports m  the Gulf have traded? And with what?
Russia's internal lines of comnunication m  areas closest to the 
Gulf were not highly developed Certainly a Russian naval foce 
permanently stationed m  the Gulf was unthinkable but would not
7have been unsmkable the Strait of Homuz would have left such 
a fleet bottled up, without logistic support, and cut off from 
ma]or bodies of water ^
The approach that we adopt m  assessing Soviet interests and objectives m  
the region of the Persian Gulf falls m  between the two views spelled out above 
We believe that the Soviets have multiple goals m  the region and are not 
necessarily on an inexorably expansionist patn towards the warm waters of the 
Indian Ocean What, then, are the Soviet interests in the region’ In our view, 
they are the followng (not necessarily m  a sequential or a hierarchical order) , 
first, to the extent possible, reducing Western influence, m  particular that of 
the United States, m  the area, second, and obversely, expanding Soviet 
influence m  the region, third, obtaining access to the resources of the region 
through the presence of friendly governments (which are preferably also at least 
professedly Marxists), and fourth and finally, ensuring their security 
interests It is obvious that our enumeration of Soviet interests and 
objectives suggests that they are intrinsically linked with one another and can 
only be separated for analytical purposes For example, if the Soviets succeed 
m  ensuring that a particular state or set of states have regimes that are not 
hostile to their interests and keep their distance from the West other Soviet 
concerns (sch as security interests) would probably also be enhanced
Without harkening back to the days of Peter the Great we can find more 
recent traces of Soviet interest in the Gulf m  the Iranian-Soviet treaty of 
1921, a particular provision of which stated that
if a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of 
usurpation by means of armed intervention m  Persia, or if such a 
power should desire to use Persian territory as a case for the 
operations against the Russian Socialist Federal Republic, or if 
a foreign power should threaten the frontiers of the Russian
8Socialist Federal Republic, or those of its allies, and if the 
Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such a 
menance after having been once called upon to do so by the 
Russian Federal Socialist Republic, the Russian Socialist Federal 
Socialist Republic shall have the right to advance its troops 
into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the 
military operations necessary for its defense 7
On the basis of this provision m  the treaty the Soviets justified the 
Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in 1941 However, even with the conclusion of 
the war the Soviets were most unwilling to leave the northern portions of Iran, 
most particularly the region known as Azerbaijan Here the Soviets relied on 
the organizational abilities of the new premier, Quavam, a man who was believed 
to have pro-Soviet sympathies Through his help the Soviets hoped to obtain a 
toehold m  the region, specifically by obtaining an oil concession Owing to a 
mixture of a vigorous U S response and the opposition of the local populace, 
the Soviets had to quietly withdraw after obtaining an agreement with the 
l^^nians on the creation of the a Soviet—Iranian oil company This, however, 
proved to be a Fhyrrhic victory, for the Iranian parliament refused to ratify 
the agreement 8 Soviet influence continued to wane m  tne area and Iran m  
particular, through the 1950s as the United States increasingly made inroads 
into this region Soecifically, m  Iran the government of Mohammed Mossadegh 
was overthrown with some support from the CIA when he nationalized the foreign 
oil companies 9 More broadly, the United States succeeded m  establishing an 
entire network of military alliances, including SEATO and CENTO, which sought to 
contain the extension of Soviet power from the Far East to the Middle East 
Although these alliances would eventually unravel because differences among 
their members proved to be greater than the fear of a common enemy, from the 
Soviet standpoint they represented a form of encirclement One of the primary
9goals of Soviet policy from the mid-1950s on was the dissolution of these 
U S -centered alliances In fact, even prior to the consolidation of the 
alliance sytem the Soviets initiated major efforts to break through this 
network
C Soviet Relations with Persian Gulf States 
The first inroads that the Soviets made into the Middle East were through 
their support of Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt and the various governments that 
ruled Syria m  the 1950s The growing Soviet role m  the region was not made 
possible through nay ideological convergence of the views of the Soviets and 
their new-found Arab friends, but rather because the Soviets were willing to 
provide the Arab states with military support m  their struggle against Israel 
and began to provide substantial amounts of development capital for the 
construction of projects viewed as important by the Arab leaders— e g , the 
Aswan High Dam m  Egypt What influence the Soviets were able to garner m  the 
Middle East m  the late 1950s remained confined to the northern and western 
section of the region and did not extend into the resource-rich Persian Gulf 
area In fact, not until a coup in Iraq in 1958 removed the pro-Western 
government were the Soviets provided with their initial opportunity to establish 
contacts with one of the Persian Gulf states In the wake of the coup that 
brought Quasim to power Iraq withdrew from Baghdada Pact and also annulled the 
1955 Anglo-Iraqi treaty Despite the anti-Western character of the new Iraqi 
regime, the Soviets quickly realized that the Iraqi communists were not to be 
permitted to operate openly and instructed them to subordinate their interests 
to those of a strong, nationalistic ruler While the Soviets were none too 
happy with (Rasim's domestic policies, they nevertheless continued to support
10
him both with economic and military aid ^  This Soviet willingness to sacrifice 
ideological goals to achieve other interests (in this case the denial of Western 
influence) was hardly exceptional, for the Soviets have repeatedly demonstrated 
their willingness to overlook the ideological coloration of many of their 
prospective clients, m  order to promote goals deemed to be more compelling
This pragmatism paid off, and with the Ba'ath coup in 1963 the Soviets were 
able to improve their standing m  Iraq The major boost to Soviet interests, 
however, came in the aftermath of the 1967 Arao-Israeli conflict when Iraq broke 
its ties with a number of Western states, notably the United States, the United 
Kingdom and West Germany It is important to point out, lest we ma*e the wrong 
inference, that while the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Western 
nations redounded to the benefit of the Soviets, the underlying reasons for the 
break had little to do with Soviet influence in Iraqi oolitics Thus, it was 
the convergence of interests that served to bring the Iraqis and the Soviets 
together, rather than the Soviet ability to make Iraq carry out its dictates 
In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, as the Iraqis sought to expand their 
influence in the Persian Gulf (particularly after Nasser's death m  1970) , they 
found further corrmon ground with the Soviets It was about this time that the 
Soviets had begun to question the utility of providing foreign aid and were 
increasingly relying on arms sales H  This shift in policy coincided with 
Iraqi needs, particularly m  light of the fact that the Iraqis had severed 
relations with the Western nations, except France, which were in the position to 
supply them with arms Furthermore, owing to its intransigence towards the 
Western states, Iraq encountered various difficulties with the Western oil 
companies This growing conflict, m  turn, provided the Soviets with the 
opportunity to provide the Iraqis with technical help for their petroluem
11
industry This help, howe/er, did not cane without cost As we have already 
noted, the Soviets had lost their earlier penchant for dispensing economic aid 
and now were increasingly tying technical assistance and weapons sales to the 
objective of meeting their own economic needs Thus, while they provided oil 
drilling equipment to the Iraqis, they simultaneously succeeded in reaching an 
agreement with them for the sale of crude oil 12 The convergence of interests 
of the two sides culminated in the signing of a treaty of friendship and 
cooperation in 1972 This treaty, which was similar to another signed by the 
Soviets with the Egyptians about a year earlier, called for each side not to 
enter into any alliances which would be inimical to the interests of the other 
Also, as the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971, it called for the two parties to 
contact each other "in the event of the development of situations spelling a 
danger to the peace of either party or creating a danger to the peace " While 
Iraqi-Soviet econome relations expanded after the signing of this treaty, the 
Iraqis nevertheless sought to maintain their freedom of action Later that 
year President Saddam Hussein made a trip to France where he signed a ten-year 
agreement with the French oil firm CFP, under which the Iraqis agreed to sell 
close to 25% of the production of their nationalized oil fields 13 During the 
following decade, despite the involvement of the Soviets m  the Iraqi oil 
industry, particularly after the oil embargo of 1973, and the continued sale of 
weaponry to Iraq (both to satisfy its regional aspirations and to curb the 
activities of the Kurdish rebels), their ability to influence Iraqi foreign 
policy remained limited Thus, despite Soviet pressure to endorse various peace 
plans for the Middle East, the Iraqis remained aloof Furthermore, after 
initial collaboration with domestic communists, Saddam Hussein dealt with than 
in a rather ruthless fashion and, though Moscow protested, it appeared unable to
12
do much to change Hussein's behavior
If the Soviets fared none-too-well in their relations with a Gulf state 
widely considered to be a quasi-client state, how has it fared with other states 
m  the Gulf since its initial forays^* Moscow's interest in the two Yemeni 
Republics became evident m  the early 1960s Following the military coup m  
North Yemen m  1962 the Soviets sought to maintain their early friendly 
relations with the strategically-located state By 1964 they had signed a 
treaty of friendship and economic and technical cooreration which provided the 
Yemenis a loan of 65 million rubles 14 Soviet activities m  North Yemen 
continued to expand until the overthrow of President Sallal in 1967 and the 
withdrawal of Egyptian troops after the June war This led to direct Soviet 
military involvement on behalf of the republican regime, but the Soviets were 
inhibited from expanding their military role m  the conflict after U S warnings 
to refrain from such activity 15 As the civil war dragged on, the military 
rulers who had overthrown President Sallal sought to reduce their dependence on 
the USSR and made overtures towards the West and the Saudis About the same 
time border clashes broke out with South Yemen, and the Soviets tilted towards 
the latter with whom they had become involved following the departure of the 
British m  1967 Yet the Soviets were unwilling to forego completely the 
investment that they had made m  North Yanen and attempted to maintain ties with 
both countries
Ultimately it was in South Yemen that the Soviets did succeed m  
establishing a firm toehold The reasons for the Soviet success in this country 
were twofold^ First, the regime that replaced British rule was radical/leftist 
m  character and was also desperately m  need of resources for the purposes of 
economic development These two factors gave the Soviets the opportunity of
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making headway into this underdeveloped nation The major payoffs that have 
accrued to the Soviets from their investments m  South Yemen include access to 
air and naval facilities, particularly in Aden ^  Furthermore, owing to its 
cordial relations with South Yemen the USSR was able to provide support for the 
Dhofari rebellion in Qnan 17
While its investments m  South Yemen have yielded rich dividends, the 
Soviets have suffered serious setbacks m  their attempts to extend their 
influence m  other parts of the region We have already discussed the Soviet 
role m  Iraq through the 1970s and have also alluded to the early interest that 
they displayed m  its major adversary, Iran Despite the long-standing interest 
m  Iran and certain cooperative arrangements that they worked out witn the Shah, 
the Soviets have been markedly unsuccessful m  obtaining any degree of long-term 
influence or leverage over Iran's foreign or domestic policies While they may 
take delight and derive comfort from Ayatollah Khomeini's description of the 
United States as "the Great Satan," they are also acutely cognizant that the 
Iranian leadership is hardly sympathetic to their interests m  the region 
Also, contrary to popular belief that the Soviets stand to gain from the 
revolutionary pronouncements and oroclivities of the Iranian regime, we would 
argue that m  all likelihood the Soviets have much to fear from the brand of 
revolution that the Ayatollah and his followers are interested m  fomenting 
Thus, while cautious about criticizing Khomeini directly, the Soviets have not 
remained silent about the Khomeini regime’s attempts to muzzle the pro-Moscow, 
Tudeh i&rty As a Soviet commentator writing in Pravda stated
About two years ago the Tudeh headquarters m  Teheran was 
seized and destroyed Then the Party's newspaper and publishing 
houses were closed down and their employees were thrown m  
prison Now, judging from the reports coming from different
1¿
parts of Iran, Tudeh party members and supporters have been 
arrested in many provinces Thus, an open crusade has begun 
against one of the oldest political parties, one that represents 
the leftist and most progressive wing of the Iranian Revolution
later m  the same article he went on to add
History teaches us that a blow to partiots, no matter what 
the pretext, ultimately turns into a blow to tne revolution 
itself It’s not too late to stop this judicial spectacle that 
is being prepared on the basis of false unsubstantiated charges 
and discredit the slogan "Death to the Tudehists' that has 
sprung up in Teheran There is no question that solidarity and 
cooperation among all patriotic and democratic forces are m  the 
interests of the Iranian people and their antiimperialist 
struggle 18
The Soviet's willingness to criticize the suppression of the Tudeh party 
stems less from concern for the plight of the party (they renamed silent wnen 
the Shah's SAVAK, the dreaded Iranian internal security force, wreaked havoc on 
the Tudeh and its members) than a simple recognition that they have little to 
lose by criticizing Iran In a very clear sense it demonstrates the low ebb of 
the Soviet position in Iran This situation is obviously of some concern to the 
Soviets, who were early in recognizing the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini 
Indeed, one can support this conclusion by examining the response to the 
Iran-Iraq war, as expressed in the Soviet media While the Soviets have 
increasingly moved towards supporting Iraq in the conflict, they have sought to 
behave in such a fashion that they do not entirely vitiate their relations with 
the Iranians Again statements in the Soviet press provide the best indication 
of this attempt to hedge their bets For example in late 1983 a Pravda 
commentator stated
Che cannot help but note that Iran's pursuit of the war "to 
a victorious conclusion" entails the stirring up of chauvinistic
15
attitudes The principles and goals of the antimonarchial 
revolution m  Iran are being consigned to oblivion, and those 
defending those principles and demanding that they be put into 
practice are being perscuted In other words, a purge of the 
truly patriotic, revolutionary and democratic elements is under 
way
Meanwhile, the Iranian-Iraqi conflict has become a feeding 
trough for the monopolies that supply the weapons These are 
being supplied to the two sides by both fair and foul means 
Everything is being done to prolong a war that is providing 
faDulous profits to the death merchants
While clearly more critical of the Iranians, the criticism is not 
particularly strident m  nature, and a substantial portion of the blame for the 
prolongation of the conflict is squarely laid at the feet of the "monopolies 
that supply the weapons " (It is pertinent to note that the Soviets themselves 
have not been averse to providing weapons to the Iraqis during the course of the 
conflict ) Yet, despite their supplier relationship with Iraq, they have not 
been able to put pressure on the Iraqis to bring an end to the protracted war 
Nor can this war be seen as serving their interests, because as long as the 
conflict persists it means the possibility of the interruption of oil supplies 
from Iraq and, worse, still the possibility of U S intervention m  the region 
The latter possibility is of consideraole concern to the Soviets, as can be 
deduced from commentaries m  the Soviet press In an article entitled, "Who Is 
Muddying The Water In The Persian Gulf," A Q n m  stated
The aggravation of the situation m  the Persian Gulf is seen 
as a convenient reason to "expand the range of US activities in 
the Middle East " In strengthening its military presence, the US 
is bringing large contingents of naval forces into the Indian 
Ocean and the Persian Gulf It is reported, m  particular, that 
an American naval unit consisting of the aircraft carrier Ranger, 
and 2000 Marines has been moved to the region According to other 
accounts, the American aircraft carrier Enterprise has been sent 
there A number of American officials confirm that Washington 
stands by the intention it voiced three years ago to resort to 
military measures, if necessary, to safeguard regular oil
16
shipnents to the Vfest from the region 20
From the above it is easy to discern that the Soviets do have a clear 
notion that the United States remains committed to maintaining access to the 
petroleum resources of the Persian Gulf and is quite willing and ready to use 
force to ensure such access
While unwilling to confront the United States directly, the Soviets are 
nevertheless seeking to expand their influence m  the region— though, as we have 
noted, their success has been quite limited Che key state which they would 
like to court (or even help engineer an overthrow of its regime) is Saudi 
Arabia At the time of writing the Soivets have no diplomatic relations with 
the Saudis and it appears unlikely that such a diplomatic breakthrough is on the 
horizon The Saudi regime is a conservative monarchy and is intransigent 
towards atheistic Communism It has also banned the communist party in the 
country, thereby denying the Soviets the opportunity of resorting to a form of 
informal penetration Furthermore, the Saudis, m  tacit cooperation with the 
United States, serve as a bulwark against revolution m  the Persian Gulf Given 
the nature of their regime, they are extremely concerned about revolutionary 
movements, whether they are of a secular or a religious character
Apart from Saudi Arabia, the only remaining actor of any significance m  
the Gulf if Kuwait Recently the Soviets established formal diplomatic ties 
with Kuwait, a country which they had viewed as independent in name only, at the 
time of its independence from the United Kingdom Kuwait has sought to pursue a 
delicate foreign policy stance, refusing to align itself with either superpower 
It has criticized the U S -sponsored Rapid Deployment Force and also the 
installation of American bases in the Persian Gulf And, while commending the
17
Soviet stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Kuwaitis have also made clear to
0 1the Soviets that they wish to minimize superpower intrusion into the Qilf 
Thus far they have been reasonably successful in this strategy
Our discussion of Soviet interests in and overtures towards the Gulf would 
be incomplete without some discussion of the recently formed Qilf Cooperation 
Council The idea of developing some form of collective security arranganent in 
the Gulf was first made public shortly after the Iranian revolution, when the 
first proposal for such an arrangement was launched by únan in 1979 The Gnanis 
proposed that an international Western forge be brought in to conduct 
surveillance m  the Gulf and that this surveillance be coordinated with a 
multinational ground force drawn from the participating Qilf states The object 
of this force was to counter possible threats from the Iranian regime This 
proposal met with opposition from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, although the Saudis 
offered the Gnanis financial assistance to purchase weaponry 22
Interest in this form of collective security arrangement surfaced once 
again m  1981 with the onset of the Iran-Iraq war This time the suggestion 
came from the Saudis, who proposed it at the Third Islamic Conference in 1981 
The Council was formed m  February 1981 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and was 
composed of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Ehurates and 
Gnan Though Iraq and the two Yemens were interested in being included in the 
Council, they were not allowed to join The Iraqis were kept out for two 
reasons First, they were embroiled m  a war with Iran and would of necessity 
drag the other members of the newly-formed Council into the war in one fashion 
or other Second, the Kuwaitis were concerned about Iraqi participation m  
Council because the Iraqis had at least two outstanding territorial disputes
with them 22
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The Qnanis once again sought to raise the possibility of U S cooperation 
with the Gulf Council, but were opposed by the Saudis The Saudi opDosition to 
direct U S involvement in the region arose less from any aversion to the United 
States (apart frcm the fundamental issue of the U S support for Israel) than 
from a fear of offending and incurring the wrath of Moscow However, desoí te 
the best efforts of the Saudis m  attemDting to avoid Moscow s displeasure the 
Soviets expressed their unhappiness with the Council The major reasons for the 
Soviet displeasure appeared to be their view that the Council would play into 
the hands of the United States, despite its professions to the contrary As a 
commentator writing m  Pravda cautioned
The desire of the group of neighboring oil extracting and 
exporting countries to expand economic cooperation m  the region 
is fully understandable During the conference, however, 
attention was paid not so much to this question as to the 
coordination and even the possiDle pooling of efforts m  the 
military sphere Referring to the 'need to defend" sea routes 
for oil transportation, the representative of the Chian regime 
proposed creating a joint naval fleet to "protect" the Strait of 
Hormuz Riyadh advanced a broader initiative of "unifying the 
military potential" of the six Near East countries The Saudi 
plan presented to the conference said that this would enable the 
Persian Gulf countries "to ensure security m  the region without 
external interference " In itself regional cooperation can be 
useful Attempts to push it into a military course under U S 
auspices can in no way serve to stabilize the situation m  the 
Etersían Gulf region or the Arab peoples' interests 24
Soviet anxiety about the Gulf Cooperation Council's possible pro-U S 
orientation reveals the degree of Soviet concern about the likelihood of 
expanding U S influence in the region, despite the major U S setback with the 
fall of the Shah of Iran and the emergence of the intransigent Khomeini regime 
TWo interlinked inferences can be made about the Soviet reactions to this feeble 
and fragmented attempt at developing a collective security arrangement m  the
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Gulf First, the Soviets fear that, if the Gulf states can indeed succeed m  
limiting the influence of the superpowers m  the region, their own interests are 
bound to suffer Thus, while they do not stand to g a m  from overt hostility 
(such as the protracted Iran-Iraq war) , they are not averse to preventing any 
movement that leads to greater cohesion and collaboration by a group of 
essentially conservative states Second, they are more concerned that this 
collaboration might lead to an invitation to the United States to enter the 
region This explains the particular wrath of the Soviets for the Guam 
proposals to include the United States m  a regional security arrangement 
In Lieu of Conclusions
Given our analysis of Soviet behavior in the Gulf, we can contend that it
Ì
do not pose an immediate danger to the interests of the Viest Indeed it appears
to us that the major immediate problems in the Gulf stem less from Soviet 
intrusions or possible Soviet interference with oil supplies than from the 
likelihood of instaoility emanating from regional conflicts and from the 
internal structure of the regimes m  the area Though we have not discussed 
regimed structures in any extensive fashion in this paper, we have alluded to 
the fundamentally unrepresentative character of most of the regimes m  the 
region As these societies undergo modernization (brought about through 
petroluem-fueled development) many of the primordial ties of clan, tribe and 
family will break down— thereby giving rise to the possibility of domestic 
instability One witnessed this to a degree in the Shah’s Iran, where the 
changes brought about by industrialization, along with many resultant social and 
economic inequities coupled with the repressive nature of his rule, gave rise to 
fundamentalist Islam Owing to the nature of the Saudi regime (despite the fact 
that its citizens enjoy the highest per capita income m  the world) it is
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entirely possible that one may witness similar uDheavals The possibility of 
such an upheaval has not been lost on the Iranian ruling clergy which has 
periodically called for the overthrow of the present Saudi regime
Furthermore, apart fran the possibilities of domestic conflict and 
upheaval, there also remains the constant likelihood of inter-state conflict 
These possibilities exist largely because of unresolved territorial disputes in 
the region which may yet culminate m  war It appears that, while the Soviet 
Union does have both the motivation and the potential for mischief-making m  the 
region, so far their activities have been limited— partly because of the 
inhospitable reception that it has received from most of the regimes and partly 
because it does not possess the necessary instruments for influence For 
example, the oil-rich states have almost uniformly shown a predilection for 
Western manufactured goods and Western capital equipment over those provided by 
the Soviets Apart from the constraints inherent in the region, Soviet activity 
in the region has also been hobbled owing to the knowledge that this area is of 
vital concern to the United States and the other OECD nations and that blatant 
interference m  the region would bring about conmensúrate U S responses This 
resolve to protect the interests of the United States and those of its allies is 
evident from the force deployments that the U S disposes over in the region, a 
fact that can hardly be lost on the Soviets 25
For the forseeable future, therefore, the Soviets are most likely to 
continue to pursue policies aimed at supporting regional states m  their 
conflicts with the West in the hope of establishing what they often refer to as 
"mutually beneficial relations" that can evolve into long-term stable 
relationships In addition, they are likely to continue to take advantage of 
instabilities within the region that promise, in their view, to weaken or
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displace pro-Western political elites All of this is part of what a group of 
French analysts of Soviet Third World policy have referred to as an oblique 
strategy” aimed at defeating the USSR's major opponents through an indirect 
strategy of the gradual undermining of its interests in the Third World 26
It is important to keep m  mind, howe/er, that even though the Soviets have 
not proven particularly successful over the course of the past thirty years in 
turning political, economic and military support for countries of the region 
into an effective Soviet presence or into the Soviet ability to dictate 
developments m  the region, the Soviet leadership has continued to expend 
resources for this purpose Although direct Soviet extension of military power 
beyond the borders of Afghanistan is not likely, the Soviet military presence m  
Afghanistan— m  particular, should the Soviets be successful in completing the 
pacification of the countryside— would provide the Soviets with the opportunity 
during a future crisis to bring military pressure to bear against either 
Ehkistan or Iran It is by no means unthinkable that in a post-Khomeini Iran 
the Soviets might provide clandestine support for elements of the Iranian 
population that opposed the continued domination of the fundamentalist clergy or 
the domination of minority regions by the government m  Teheran
The Gulf region, as we have noted above, is of vital importance for the 
economic well-being of Wèstern Europe and East Asia So long as the USSR 
remains conrmitted to an overall policy of attempting to undermine Wèstern 
interests m  this area— as well as m  other areas of the world— the United 
States and its allies must be prepared to respond effectively As we have 
argued, the Soviets are far more likely to pursue policies aimed at supporting 
domestic instability in pro-Western states and supporting states in the region 
m  conflicts with the West, than to engage m  direct military involvement m  the
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region However, their military presence m  Afghanistan could not only provide 
a bridge-head from which to support unrest elsewhere, but can also act as a form
of intimidation used to influence the decisions of political elites throughout 
the area
23
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